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FACT FINDING FAITH
Melanie DiPietro, S. C. *
Yes . . . [in] other words, it is between me and Jehovah; not the
courts... I'm willing to take my chances.., now get that straight
Death and dying are the second ethical concern fundamental to
good health care . . . .Medicine must learn to manage people's
dying .... Citing the "You won't die - not in my hospital, any-
way" philosophy prevalent in some institutions, he pleaded that we
must recognize and allow people to make decisions about death
based on values important to them - not based on medicine's
values.2
I INTRODUCTION AND SCOPE OF THE PROBLEM
That persons should be able to make decisions about death based on val-
ues important to them sounds like a self-evident truth. One hardly recog-
nizes that it may not only be suggesting a "radical rearrangement" 3 of our
health care system but of the judicial analysis of issues involving death and
dying as well.
The Jehovah's Witness cases which involve the issue of whether compe-
tent adults can refuse blood transfusions, which in most instances are viewed
as a simple cure or a means of effectuating a cure, turn almost inevitably on a
medical-value analytical paradigm rather than on a personal-value analytical
paradigm.
The leading cases addressing the Jehovah's Witness' right to refuse blood
transfusions span over twenty years.4 A range of complex legal, moral and
public policy questions have arisen from the facts and procedures of these
cases.' Former Chief-Justice Burger (then circuit judge) dissenting in In re
* B.A. Seton Hall; M.A. Occidental College; J.D. Duquesne; J.C.L. Univ. of St.
Thomas, Rome, June 1987.
1. In Re Osborne, 294 A.2d 372, 374 (D.C. 1972).
2. Catholic Health World, Sept. 15, 1986, at 4, col. 1.
3. Id.
4. Moore, Their Life is in the Blood: Jehovah's Witnesses, Blood Transfusions, and the
Courts, 10 N. Ky. L. REV. 281 (1983).
5. Paris, Compulsory Medical Treatment and Religious Freedom: Whose Law Shall Pre-
vail?, 10 U.S.F. L. REV. 1, 12 (1975).
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President and Directors of Georgetown College, Inc., questioned whether any
"Judicially cognizable issue is presented when a legally competent adult re-
fuses, on grounds of conscience, to consent to a medical treatment essential
to preserve life." 6 This question has not been examined by the courts with
the same intensity that traditional criteria have been analyzed. The state's
interests that have been used by the courts to justify the appointment of
guardians to consent to blood transfusions for Jehovah's Witnesses have
ranged from the state's interest in preserving life, to parens patriae, to
preventing suicide.7 In addition, the right of doctors to practice medicine in
accordance with their professional ethics, the right of the hospital to render
care within the expectations of prevailing medical therapy, and the right of
both to be free from fear of civil or criminal liability have prevailed8 to sup-
port judicial determinations ordering blood transfusions notwithstanding
Witnesses' refusals based on personal religious belief.
Numerous commentators have analyzed and reanalyzed these criteria.9
The courts have been accused of "characteristic superficiality" in evaluating
both society's interest in preserving life and the individual's right to exercise
his religion.'" Judicial substantiation of the state's interest and the negative
characterization of a patient's interest in order to facilitate a court's decision
to order treatment has been called an "unnecessary and arbitrary exercise of
the power of the state over the individual."" Courts have also been cited for
using an inappropriate balancing test in weighing conflicting interests which
threaten a limitation of the preferred right of freedom to exercise one's reli-
gious beliefs. 2
In a well documented review of the judicial decisions in the Jehovah's
Witness blood transfusion cases, not only were the legal and theoretical in-
consistencies 3 in the traditional criteria shown, but also shown were the
6. In Re President & Directors of Georgetown College, Inc., 331 F.2d 1000 (D.C. Cir.),
reh'g denied, 331 F.2d 1010, 1015 (D.C. Cir. 1964) (Burger, J., dissenting).
7. Moore, supra note 4, at 300.
8. United States v. George, 239 F. Supp. 752, 754 (D. Conn. 1965); John F. Kennedy
Memorial Hosp. v. Heston, 58 N.J. 576, 579, 279 A.2d 670, 673 (1971).
9. Eg., Paris, supra note 5; Note, Compulsory Medical Treatment and Constitutional
Guarantees: A Conflict?, 33 U. PIr. L. REV. 628 (1972) [hereinafter Constitutional Guaran-
tees]; Note, Compulsory Medical Treatment: The State's Interest Re-evaluated, 51 MINN. L.
REV. 293 (1966) [hereinafter State's Interest Re-evaluated].
10. Note, Compulsory Medical Treatment and the Free Exercise of Religion, 42 IND. L.J.
386, 389 (1967).
11. Constitutional Guarantees, supra note 9, at 637.
12. E.g., Moore, supra note 4; Paris, supra note 5; Constitutional Guarantees, supra note 9;
State's Interest Re-evaluated, supra note 9.
13. Paris, supra note 5, at 14-30.
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lack of factual support for decisions based on the anti-suicide analysis' 4 and
the fear of possible criminal charges.' 5 Thus it was concluded, that in view
of the present constitutional hierarchy, all of the counterclaims of state inter-
est - preserving the "status quo, police power, parens patriae, anti-suicide
designs, doctor's conscience, malpractice dangers, and informed consent -
falter in the case[s] . . .of competent adult Jehovah's Witness[es]."' 6 Re-
cently, the judiciary has begun to subordinate the physician's interest' 7 and
to lessen the fear of malpractice suits arising from acquiescence to blood
transfusion refusals.18 Though the importance of some of these traditional
criteria seems to be changing, ultimately, the personal convictions of the
judge will prevail:
Courts will probably continue to hold that a state's interest in pre-
serving life is more important than any constitutional right of the
patient, even when weighed in an ad hoc balancing test. This will
depend upon the philosophy of the individual court, as well as on
the facts of the case. 19
It appears that individual judicial philosophies and the selective use, inter-
pretation and meaning ascribed to the facts of each case seem to be influ-
enced excessively by the medical-value paradigm and insufficiently by a
personal-value paradigm. More legislative action is necessary to provide
guidelines in these cases.2" Yet, any useful judicial or legislative guidelines
in this area necessitate some articulation and clarification of the underlying
values of the analytical paradigm that appear to control the way the legal
issues are framed and analyzed by the courts. Equal attention must be given
also to the human factors that ultimately control decisions made by people
for and about people.
The apparent presumptive and unexamined weight given to the values of
medicine and to the medical profession, as distinct from the individual's val-
ues, are evidenced in the half century of cases that assume the ordinariness
of a blood transfusion and its curative value, admit uncorroborated or unex-
amined medical testimony that gives controlling preference to the practice
and profession of medicine.
The United States District Court for the District of Connecticut in United
14. Id. at 23.
15. Id. at 27.
16. Id. at 30-31.
17. Randolph v. City of New York, 117 A.D.2d 44, 48, 501 N.Y.S.2d 837, 841 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1986).
18. Randolph, 117 A.D.2d at 47, 501 N.Y.S.2d at 840.
19. Moore, supra note 4, at 302.
20. See Moore, Proxy Consent for Incompetent Non-Terminally Ill Adult Patients, 6 J.
LEGAL MED. 1 (1985).
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States v. George, characterized the refusal of a blood transfusion as dictating
to the "treating physician a course of treatment amounting to malprac-
tice."'" The controlling weight given to the simplicity of a blood transfusion
and medical treatment is clearly evidenced in John F. Kennedy Memorial
Hospital v. Heston " where it was found that blood transfusions were viewed
as non-deadly options and presented no serious risk of death or permanent
injury.
In stating that "unless the medical option itself is laden with the risk of
death or of serious infirmity, the State's interest in sustaining life in such
circumstances is hardly distinguishable from its interest in the case of sui-
cide," 3 the court clearly evidenced a preference for medicine which by-
passes the personal values of the individual and focuses judicial inquiry
primarily on the efficacy of medical procedures. Generally, the doctors' alle-
gations are accepted, without corroboration, leading to the suggestion that a
uniform standard of medical proof must be established. 4
Several courts25 appear to suggest that crossing the threshold of the hospi-
tal door and submitting oneself to treatment raises the presumption that one
forfeits his rights or, at the very least suggests that constitutionally preferred
rights do not have equal weight against a physician's professional interest.26
It has been held that a Jehovah's Witness' submission to treatment does not
give him the authority to present hospitals and doctors with an impossible
choice.2 7 Such positions, however, ignore the inviolable right of competent
adults to make their own medical decisions,28 the consensual nature of the
physician-patient relationship and the legal and ethical right of autonomy. 9
The apparent bias toward the medical-value paradigm together with the
minimization of the preferred constitutional right of the freedom of religion,
provokes one commentator to argue energetically that the medical profes-
21. United States v. George, 239 F. Supp. 752, 754 (D. Conn. 1965).
22. John F. Kennedy Memorial Hosp. v. Heston, 58 N.J. 576, 579, 279 A.2d 670, 673
(1971). This case predates the current knowledge of the risks of blood transfusions resulting
from the questionable reliability of screening procedures for the AIDS virus.
23. Id.
24. State's Interest Re-evaluated, supra note 9, at 293, 304.
25. See In Re President & Directors of Georgetown College, 331 F.2d 1000 (D.C. Cir.),
reh'g denied, 331 F.2d 1010, 1015 (D.C. Cir. 1964); George, 239 F. Supp. 752; John F. Kennedy
Memorial Hosp., 58 N.J. 576, 279 A.2d 670.
26. Paris, supra note 5, at 25-26; Constitutional Guarantees, supra note 9, at 634-37;
State's Interest Re-evaluated, supra note 9, at 301.
27. In Re President & Directors of Georgetown College, 331 F.2d at 1009.
28. State's Interest Re-evaluated, supra note 9, at 293-94.
29. See PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN
MEDICINE AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH; MAKING HEALTH CARE DECI-
SIONS, THE ETHICAL AND LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF INFORMED CONSENT IN THE PATIENT-
PRACTITIONER RELATIONSHIP 64, 64-66 (1982).
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sion is not entitled to the uncontrolled discretion that it enjoys. He advo-
cates that "instead of putting people under the control of physicians, the
control of physicians should be under the thumbs of laymen."
30
The bias in favor of medical therapy and the medical profession's values
ultimately challenges the credibility and legal quality of the basic judicial
process of fairness in the right and opportunity to present testimony at a
hearing and to have it weighed and balanced against some objective legal
criteria. Given this medical-value bias, the judiciary jeopardizes the entire
judicial process by equating the important social interest of doctors to prac-
tice with the constitutionally protected religious rights of patients. In so
doing, as has been argued, they ultimately use the less stringent "rational
basis" test instead of the "compelling interest" test required for limiting the
exercise of a preferred right. The result is that a physician's popular under-
standing prevails over judicial determinations. A doctor's interest in the ex-
ercise of professional judgment and conscience reigns superior to the
person's constitutionally preferred right of religious conscience. 3,
Criticisms concerning the use or results of a proper balancing test could be
explained as the inevitable results of human perception and judgments.
However, such criticisms as the absence of the perception of a fundamental
fairness in being heard or of distorted legal reasoning and bias toward minor-
ity religious positions are less tolerable in our judicial system.32 This lack of
fundamental openness is evidenced in the numerous ex parte hearings which
are held without notice even to families who were present in the hospital33 or
who could have been contacted.34 The minimization of the religious issue or
its significance to the person is further evidence of this fundamental
unfairness.
One court characterized the party's religious conviction as a scruple.
3 5
Another called such refusals "pestersome practices ... [that] have clogged
the dockets ... for half a century," but also acknowledged the existence of
"state sponsored insensitivity to their practice of articles of their faith."36
They have also been termed peculiar religious indoctrinations over which
30. How, Religion, Medicine and Law: The Blood Transfusion Cases, a Legal, Religious
and Medical Issue, 3 CAN. B.J. 365, 414 (1960).
31. Paris, supra note 5, at 25-27.
32. How, supra note 30, at 367, 370-74.
33. In re Brooks, 32 111. 2d 361, 363, 364, 205 N.E.2d 435, 437, 438 (1965).
34. In re Dorone, 502 A.2d 1271, 1280 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985) (Beck, J., dissenting).
35. In Re President & Directors of Georgetown College, 331 F.2d 1000, 1009 (D.C. Cir.),
reh'g denied, 331 F.2d 1010, 1015 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
36. In re Brown, 478 So. 2d 1033, 1037 (Miss. 1985).
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common sense will prevail in the pressure of imminent death. 37 These char-
acterizations of religious convictions are insensitive on their face. Such min-
imizations are intolerable when evidence shows that even when they have
previously experienced a family member's death attributable to a refusal of a
transfusion, Jehovah's Witnesses continue to adhere to their beliefs.38 The
dismissal of the significance of this belief to a Jehovah's Witness is also evi-
dent in such conclusions as the following: "The doctrine forbidding transfu-
sions does not appear to be a fundamental belief in the Jehovah's Witnesses
religion. It is not a part of the religious ceremony, and its absence will not
prevent continued practice of the religion." 39 Their explicit beliefs' and the
fact that dis-fellowshipping4" (separation from the congregation which re-
quires a reconciliation process for the individual to be reunited to the con-
gregation) may also result from voluntarily receiving a blood transfusion
negates such a conclusion. Finally, a forced blood transfusion has been anal-
ogized to the traumatic violence of rape.42
Though it has often been argued that the Constitution protects personal
beliefs, thoughts, emotions and sensations including the most unorthodox
minorities,43 judges decide cases not "solely by reference to law," but ac-
cording to other factors hidden from view - values that are peculiarly the
decision-maker's " 'own' values and not necessarily those he is directed to
invoke."'
II. PERSONAL VALUE DECISION-MAKING PARADIGM
A judicial analysis that commences with values important to the person
may be able to promote the protection of preferred constitutional rights and
respect the interests, dignity and freedom of all individuals concerned. A
recent Pennsylvania Superior Court case involving a Jehovah's Witness, In
37. Ford, Refusal of Blood Transfusions by Jehovah's Witnesses, 10 CATH. U.L. REV. 212,
222 (1964).
38. In Re Osborne, 294 A.2d 372, 374 (D.C. 1972); Hoener v. Bertinato, 67 N.J. Super.
517, 171 A.2d 140 (1961).
39. Note, supra note 10, at 402.
40. WATCHTOWER BIBLE AND TRACT SOCIETY OF NEW YORK, INC., INTERNATIONAL
BIBLE STUDENTS ASSOCIATION, JEHOVAH'S WITNESSES AND THE QUESTION OF BLOOD
(1977).
41. Telephone Interview with Larry M. Stogsdill, Elder, Minister of Jehovah's Witnesses
(Dec. 8, 1986) [hereinafter Stogsdill Interview].
42. Paris, supra note 5, at 28 n.176; Stogsdill Interview, supra note 41.
43. American Communications Ass'n. v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 448 (1950) (Black, J.,
dissenting); Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 448 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
44. W. BISHIN & C. STONE, LAW, LANGUAGE, AND ETHICS, AN INTRODUCTION TO
LAW AND LEGAL METHOD 26 (1972).
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Re Dorone,45 though accepting a medical-value paradigm, provocatively
states that before it could give probative value to a medical alert card alleg-
edly carried by the Jehovah's Witness, it would need to make its own in-
dependent findings concerning the quality and intensity of the individual's
faith in the face of death. This statement invites consideration of the pos-
sibilities of judicial inquiry of such a personal value as faith.
Factual Background
The Pennsylvania Superior Court ruled that the trial court's two orders,
both issued at ex parte hearings on August 1 and 3, 1984, appointing a hospi-
tal administrator as temporary guardian to consent to blood transfusions for
a Jehovah's Witness, were properly issued.46 It is not clear whether the
twenty-two year old unmarried Jehovah's Witness was conscious when he
was taken to the first hospital immediately following his automobile accident
on July 30, 1984. The opinion indicates that "[s]urgery was performed, but
he lapsed into a coma and was transported by helicopter ' 47 to appellee
hospital.
The appellants were the Witness' parents. The young man had purport-
edly signed a medical alert card to the effect that for religious reasons he did
not wish to be given a blood transfusion. Though this medical alert card was
not admitted as evidence, the trial court was advised at the August 1 hearing
that the patient had been carrying "some kind of card identifying him as a
Jehovah's Witness and indicating something about a blood transfusion."48
The testimony at the first hearing was limited to that of the treating physi-
cians, the surgeon and the hospital administrator. The second hearing on
August 3 included all the testimony presented at the August 1 hearing and
in addition, included the testimony of an attorney who verbally entered his
appearance by phone for the patient. During the extended colloquy which
ensued between the court, the attorney and counsel for appellee, the appel-
lant's attorney described his own medical alert card and the contents and
statements contained thereon, in order to demonstrate the contents of the
card which appellants' son allegedly possessed but did not have on his per-
son when he was transported by helicopter to appellees hospital.49
The appellants argued that they should have been appointed the tempo-
rary guardian of their son and that the orders authorizing transfusions in-
fringed on their son's right to self-determination and his first amendment
45. In Re Dorone, 502 A.2d 1271, 1280 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985) (Beck, J., dissenting).
46. Id. at 1279.
47. Id. at 1276.
48. Id. at 1277.
49. Id. at 1276, 1277.
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right to freedom of religion.5" They argued further that the evidence found
in the patient's possession, specifically the medical alert card, and his stand-
ing as a Jehovah's Witness, should have warranted the naming of his parents
as guardians and the application of the doctrine of substituted judgment.5 "
The court, however, framed the issue as follows: "[W]as the evidence that
the patient would refuse a blood transfusion of such quality that the court
should not have appointed a temporary guardian to consent to a transfusion
being given?" 52
After addressing the procedural questions at issue, the superior court fo-
cused on the testimony of the doctors concerning the patient's condition that
was received into evidence at the ex parte hearings. The court rejected the
appellants' arguments for application of the doctrine of substituted judg-
ment.53 It relied on a previous District of Columbia Court of Appeals deci-
sion, In re Osborne, 4 which sustained forced blood transfusion. Osborne
held that when an initial appraisal of a patient's personal desires and ability
for rational choice cannot be determined judicially, it is "better to give
weight to the known instinct for survival which can, in a critical situation,
alter previously held convictions." 5 5 The Dorone court ended its analysis
with an indication of the type of evidence and the standard of proof of the
individual's faith that it would require in order to rule against a forced blood
transfusion. Specifically addressing the value of the medical alert card the
court concluded that it would require:
evidence on whether the patient had signed the card as an affirma-
tion of faith and statement of unity with other members of his con-
gregation, or whether he had really contemplated it as binding in a
death threatening situation . . . and whether the patient's faith
50. Id. at 1273. The court did not discuss the infringement upon the first amendment
right to *any degree. In a footnote, the court indicated that the appellants did not have stand-
ing to raise their son's first amendment rights. The appellants had standing to argue whether
they should have been appointed their son's temporary guardian. In order to address that
question, the court needed to consider if their son's rights had been violated. The court's
refusal to appoint the appellants as guardians violated no right of the appellants.
51. Id. at 1277. Substituted judgment is an attempt to execute a judgment decision as one
believes the patient would decide if able to act for himself.
52. Id. at 1275.
53. The court's rejection was based on three reasons: (1) there were no Pennsylvania
appellate decisions applying the doctrine of substituted judgment to allow refusal of medical
treatment; (2) where the doctrine had been applied, it was typically to allow refusal of life
preserving treatment on behalf of incompetent persons who were terminally ill; and (3) there
were no cases that allow the doctrine to be used to refuse, in an emergency and against the
treating physician's advice, the provision of life preserving treatment to a young adult. Id. at
1277.
54. In Re Osborne, 294 A.2d 372, 374 (D.C. 1972).
55. Id. at 374.
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would not waver even in the face of death.56
The bold assertion of an inquiry into "faith" elicits simultaneously contra-
dictory reactions. Faith is religion and mystery, it is not within the proper
scope of judicial inquiry; it is the precise object of constitutional protection.
However, to label the inquiry as one of faith both identifies and prioritizes
the personal values jeopardized in these cases. Certainly, the least that can
be said is that the court's proposed inquiry by focusing on "faith" appears to
give appropriate attention to preferred constitutional rights and to shift the
decision-making paradigm from medical values to the individual's personal
values.
The court's disjunctive inquiry of evidence on whether the patient's signa-
ture on the card is "an affirmation of faith and a statement of unity with
other members of his congregation or whether he had really contemplated it
as binding in a death threatening situation"57 is curious. It would appear to
suggest a presumption that needs to be overcome: namely, that conscious,
communal or symbolic actions have no presumed real meaning or signifi-
cance for the person in the situation contemplated by their action. The
court's requirement of a certitude concerning the degree of firmness and fi-
nality and the unwaverability of the person's faith in the face of death, how-
ever, is expected.
These criteria present several interesting questions for advocates of a per-
sonal-value decision-making paradigm: Can faith be a subject of judicial fact
finding? What type of evidence reveals the relationship between one's per-
sonal affirmation of faith and unity with a congregation and his firm, present
intent in the face of death? What is the probative value of that evidence for a
finding of fact concerning the intensity, firmness and finality of one's faith in
the face of death? Can extrinsic evidence reach the standard of proof sug-
gested by the court?
III. CAN FAITH BE THE SUBJECT OF JUDICIAL FACT FINDING?
"We Americans turn over more of our society's disputes, decisions and
concerns to courts and lawyers than does any other nation."58 Such an incli-
nation has been attributed to popular perceptions of the judicial decision-
making process as "quasi-scientific, objective and ultimately successful be-
cause of the technical expertise of judges and lawyers."'59 Even with our
popular bias toward judicial conflict resolution, our perception of the quasi-
56. In Re Dorone, 502 A.2d at 1278-79.
57. Id. at 1278 (emphasis added).
58. THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 1 (D. Kairys ed. 1982).
59. Id.
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scientific and objective nature of the judicial decision-making process may
incline us to dismiss such an inquiry into faith as impossible or at least inap-
propriate in the judicial forum. In popular usage, faith usually is the "label"
used for that phenomena which quasi-scientific reasoning, logic and exper-
tise cannot explain.
Recent studies in the phenomena of the development of human faith cause
one to pause and reconsider an initial resistance to the court's statement. It
seems that the first criterion of the Dorone court's inquiry may be, or has
been, the subject of judicial scrutiny. An initial resistance to fact finding
faith came from a narrow definition of faith, variously defined as the "inner
light of the soul, intermediate beween the light of natural reason and the
light of glory"6 an illusion,61 or dynamic phenomena edged with mystery.62
However, faith is also a human way of seeing the world, and knowing and
interpreting reality and experiences.63 Despite its mysterious and illusive
characteristics, faith has been studied as a developmental universal human
phenomenon, so fundamental that none can live long without it64 and more
basic than credal identifications. 61 In fact, faith, which is fundamentally dif-
ferent from belief,66 does not need to have any particular religious thema-
tization. According to James W. Fowler, "the unthinking modem
identification of faith with belief" is an Archie Bunker problem.67
The non-doctrinal content of faith is that vision which enables one to find
meaning in the world and in his own life. This meaning is the profound,
ultimate and stable center of value which enables persons to face catastrophe
and confusion unperturbed.6" This universally human experience, differenti-
ated from religious belief, but described as faith 69 and seen as the conviction,
commitment or center of trust70 which functions in a person's life to give
him meaning, can obviously be the subject of judicial fact finding.
In the context of a Jehovah's Witness' renunciation of a blood transfusion,
the definitional approach suggested here focuses the inquirer on the function
of the person's belief in his life - not on its theological or logical content.
60. THE FAITH THAT DOES JUSTICE 10 (J. Haughey ed. 1977).
61. Id. at 49.
62. J. FOWLER, STAGES OF FAITH: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF HUMAN DEVELOPMENT AND
THE QUEST FOR MEANING 1, 32-33 (1981).
63. Id. at 98.
64. Id. at xiii.
65. Id. at 5.
66. Id. See also THE FAITH THAT DOES JUSTICE, supra note 60, at 10-15.
67. J. FOWLER, supra note 62, at 33.
68. Id. at 11, 14.
69. Id. at 91-92 (concerning this use of the term "faith").
70. THE FAITH THAT DOES JUSTICE, supra note 60, at 13.
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Judicial scrutiny would thus be directed toward external evidence concern-
ing the person's convictions and commitment which shows the relationship
of his lifestyle and choices to his statements and social relationships. Such
inquiries would thus make the person the referent for determining the appro-
priateness of a given treatment and not the ease of administration or the
advanced technology of the therapy. Since the court's inquiry is focused on
the qualities of the individual and not the religious system 71 there is no con-
stitutional reason to avoid such an inquiry nor is it outside the competence
of the judiciary. There is no inherent risk of trespassing into doctrinal mat-
ters by a judicial inquiry into the content of faith defined as those realities,
values and commitments in which an individual finds meaning which are
distinct from theologically substantive inquiries.72
The generic definition of faith proposed here is consistent with the issues
discussed in the 1983 report of the President's Commission for the Study of
Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research.73
That report, though not using the term faith, stresses the need to identify the
person's "stable values," preferences and goals. 74 These have been identified
above as the content of faith. This type of inquiry can be done in the emer-
gency setting of most of the hearings in blood transfusion cases.
In In Re Osborne,75 both the trial and the appellate court centered the
evidentiary hearing on the personal values of the patient. Given the above
broadened definition of faith, these inquiries could be characterized appro-
priately as evidence of faith. The appellate tribunal, praising the lower
court's handling of the case, sought additional evidence on some issues
doubtful in the trial court's record. Specifically, it sought evidence concern-
ing the patient's desire to continue his present physical life. The court recog-
nized that life's meaning is both a physical and spiritual reality.76 With that
recognition, it considered the scope and depth of the patient's beliefs con-
cerning the relationship between a court ordered transfusion and his chances
for "everlasting life."'77 Finally, the court sought evidence of the effect of the
forced blood transfusion on the patient's religious self perception.
Given the span of three days between the first surgery and the two hear-
71. J. FOWLER, supra note 62, at 11.
72. Id. at 273.
73. See PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN
MEDICINE AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH: DECIDING TO FORGO LIFE-
SUSTAINING TREATMENT: A REPORT ON THE ETHICAL, MEDICAL, AND LEGAL ISSUES IN
TREATMENT (1983) [hereinafter PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION].
74. Id. at 128-29.
75. In Re Osborne, 294 A.2d 372 (D.C. 1972).
76. Id. at 374.
77. Id.
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ings in In Re Dorone, these inquiries seem to have been possible. That such
inquiries were not made is possibly a result of the bias of the underlying
paradigm of a medical-value analysis. It is also the result of the unconscious
dismissal of the potentially significant relationship between the force of one's
personal values consciously expressed in community and one's intent about
life at the moment facing death. The court is right in requiring some eviden-
tiary link between past acts and present intent. This is precisely what should
be the primary subject of the fact finding process at the hearing. Some fact
finding of faith may have been possible had evidence been introduced con-
cerning the Witness' convictions and commitments. This inquiry necessi-
tates a preference for testimony from family and community.
IV. AFFIRMATION OF CONGREGATIONAL RELATIONSHIP: DISJUNCTIVE
OR CONJUNCTIVE EVIDENCE?
If one accepts the fact that the human experience of faith is a social and
relational process,78 he is sensitized to the disjunctive of the Dorone court
formula. The Dorone formula is stated in the disjunctive, "an affirmation of
faith and a statement of unity with other members of his congregation, or
whether he had really contemplated it as binding in a death-threatening situ-
ation."79 The court is correct in implying that a relationship with a congre-
gation, however strong the evidence may reveal it to be, does not allow the
conclusion that one's belief in the face of death is equally firm. However, the
disjunctive may be too extreme. The disjunctive could easily have been a
conjunctive. A conjunctive implies a potentially positive evidentiary rela-
tionship between one's deliberate, symbolic and communal acts and one's
personal center of value, commitment, conviction and trust. This relation-
ship is inconclusive, not exclusive or disjoined.
The relationship between one's living, consistent affirmations of faith and
continuous congregational membership is interrelated with and indictative,
though not conclusive, of the potential intensity or durability of one's faith
affirmations in the face of death. "Faith is a relational enterprise, triadic or
conventional in shape .... Our commitments and trusts shape our identi-
ties. They determine (and are determined by) the communities we join."8
James Fowler indicates that the very structuring activity that is faith in-
volves both the describable operations of a person's knowing and valuing
and the powers of the symbols, beliefs and practices of the faith community
78. J. FOWLER, supra note 62, at 18.
79. In Re Dorone, 502 A.2d at 1271, 1280 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985) (Beck, J., dissenting).
80. J. FOWLER, supra note 62, at 18.
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of which that person is a part."
A determination concerning the potential probative value of one's affirma-
tion of faith and congregational membership necessitates testimony from the
family and from the persons who comprise the Witness' community. If the
paradigm of personal-values decision-making and the faith inquiry is to be
integral, this evidence must be received and weighed. The identification of
competent witnesses and the weight and credibility to be given the testimony
is determined by the court as in any other evidentiary hearing.
In an article entitled Limits of Guardian Treatment Refusal: A Reasonable
Standard, Robert Veatch argues for special deference to be given to
"bonded" guardians.82 Though he argues that bonded guardians (family
and associates) best know the patient's beliefs and values, 3 he also recog-
nizes that often the guardian only has evidence of general values and beliefs
and cautions that the guardian's own biases may be confused for that of the
84 H utepatient. He buttresses the argument for bonded guardians on the inherent
rights of the family and its legal importance as a primary associational unit
whose integrity the state should not injure.8 5 By analogy, this ethical rea-
soning appears to be consistent with the relational realities of faith as generi-
cally described by Fowler. Therefore, the testimony of bonded persons
should be preferred in a personal-value based decision-making paradigm.
The Dorone court simply excluded any testimony of the parents from con-
sideration because of its unarticulated bias, not because the court reasonably
concluded on evidence before it that the parties failed to meet their burden
of proof or that they convinced the court that they could not differentiate
their subjective values from those of the patient. The recognition of the re-
latedness of the community and of the relevance of its information to the
determination of the possibility or the probability of the requisite firmness
and unwaverability of the Jehovah's Witness' present conviction and com-
mitment would reduce the use of ex parte hearings and therefore reduce
claims of fundamental unfairness.8 6
V. THE STANDARD OF PROOF FOR FINDING
THE FACT OF FIRM FAITH
The obvious problem, especially in the case of a suddenly comatose or
81. Id. at 273.
82. Veatch, Limits of Guardian Treatment Refusal.: A Reasonableness Standard, 9 AM. J.
L. & MED. 427 (1984).
83. Id. at 447.
84. Id. at 440.
85. Id. at 446-47.
86. How, supra note 30.
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impaired young patient, is the probative value and weight to be given the
evidence of the bonded witnesses and of the previous acts and general state-
ments of the Jehovah's Witness. But these judgments are precisely what
courts are called upon to make in any fact finding process.
In a personal-value analytical paradigm, it is less likely that the results in
Jehovah's Witness cases will be a matter of the arbitrariness of the judiciary,
or its hidden values. The result will be related to the success of the propo-
nents in meeting an appropriate burden of proof. If that burden is not met,
then judicial reliance on the assumed universal instinct for survival is ethi-
cally and legally required.
The Dorone court suggests that the standard of proof to be applied to the
finding of faith is that the Witness' faith be presently firm, final and unwa-
vering in the face of death. This standard goes beyond a reasonable doubt
burden and suggests one of certitude. The fact situations often found in the
Jehovah's Witness cases-youthful, healthy persons, in a non-terminal ill-
ness, suddenly and temporarily incompetent but with a prognosis of certain
or near certain recovery with a blood transfusion-compel such a standard.
The analysis thus far applauds a focus on the ultimate personal value-
faith. It suggests that judicial inquiries can provide evidence of faith and,
further, that such an inquiry necessitates evidence from one's bonded com-
munity. Yet, recognition of the full realities of faith as mystery and as inter-
nal to the person do suggest that third parties may not be able to meet the
evidentiary burden necessitated by the fact situation in determining the force
of one's convictions in the unexpected crisis of an ultimate, irreversible
choice. As cognizance is taken of the human universal of faith in individual
lives, equal cognizance should be given to mystery which may make finding
the certitude of faith ultimately beyond judicial resolution.
The judicial standard of proof-certitude-is linked to the implicit re-
quirement for a conscious, mature level of conviction. In the context of this
degree of certitude required by courts, a disjunctive statement is more under-
standable, even if it remains too extreme. Perhaps the judicial disjunctive is
but an implicit recognition that an individual's maturation in faith is devel-
opmental. Faith's developmental stages have been linked to the natural
evolution of one's life experiences that are associated usually with chrono-
logical aging.8 7
While identification of general norms concerning the individual stages and
social dimensions of human faith is possible,"8 it is one's specific life exper-
iences and crises that force a specific examination and evaluation of previ-
87. See generally J. FOWLER, supra note 62.
88. Id. at 114.
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ously tacit and unexamined values.8 9 Through these experiences, one either
reaffirms formerly tacit values or reshapes and perhaps discards them.9°
This transition from tacit or generally accepted rules to conscious, person-
ally assumed convictions and commitment requires time, experience and
challenge. 9' A judicial acceptance of the disjunctive impliedly requires evi-
dence of this transition. Regrettably, however, only after a particular crisis
experience and reflection thereon, can one know the junction of a given be-
lief in his life; for it is truly an internal faith experience.
It is obvious that the significance of a faith experience may not be totally
discernable to third parties. For a competent person as in In Re Osborne,
the person spoke for himself and insisted that he was willing to "take his
chances." 92 For an incompetent young person, such as in In Re Dorone,
testimony may be available from family and friends concerning past expres-
sions of one's convictions, beliefs, and actions evidencing the necessary level
of human faith development required for judicial action. Even if some testi-
mony is available, however, there is still a potential evidentiary problem.
This evidentiary problem regarding the standard of proof is inherent in
the complex nature of faith which is multi-dimensional and has been analo-
gized to a multi-sided cube which:
[flrom any one angle of vision, . . . the observer can see and de-
scribe at least three sides of the cube. But the cube has back-sides,
a bottom and insides as well. Several angles of vision have to be
coordinated simultaneously to do any real justice in a characteriza-
tion of faith .... Unlike some other topics on which we might do
research and reflect, we cannot easily externalize faith and make it
the detached object of our inquiry ... faith, as a mystery, is per-
plexing because we are internal to it.93
In addition to the internal and cubical nature of faith where an observa-
tion of one dimension may change or be inconsistent with an observation of
another dimension, it must also be recognized that it is possible that "faith at
times can co-exist with actions that are inconsistent with itself.",94 Faith is
not subject to a simple "show and tell" or a mathematical formula. This
reality is further complicated by the inherent difficulties in simple communi-
cation. Giving present specific meaning to past actions is always a compli-
cated process, requiring human judgment concerning meaning and intent.
89. Id. at 7.
90. Id. at 31, 100.
91. Id. at 114.
92. In Re Osborne, 294 A.2d 372 (D.C. 1972).
93. J. FOWLER, supra note 62, at 32 (emphasis added).
94. THE FAITH THAT DOES JUSTICE, supra note 60, at 39.
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Even explicit communication of a person in a life threatening situation in-
volves subtle interpretations by the observer of the real meaning of another's
statements. 95
While the experience of faith in the broad sense as described may be uni-
versal and even subject to generalization about its developmental stages, the
precise function of it in a specific person facing death may be something that
third parties cannot testify to with the degree of certainty required for judi-
cial actions allowing refusals of transfusions which will result in imminent
death. While it may generally be possible to describe stages of human faith
development, ultimately religious faith, which is the final issue in Jehovah's
Witness cases, is God's business.
What has been described so far is only the human side of faith. The full
experience of faith involves a relationship with the transcendent other. One
writer admits that the matured experience of faith is not confined by self-
designed models, but lies in the "radical freedom of God" which is the "cen-
tral and indispensable testimony" of faith.
96
The source of conflicting reaction to the Dorone court's statement of in-
quiry into faith rests in the standard of proof it necessarily requires, not in
the inquiry itself. It appears that because faith is ultimately a mysterious
relationship with the transcendent, it will be very difficult to reach the legiti-
mate standard of certitude required, especially by hearsay evidence. Given
this problem of evidentiary proof, even with a judicial analysis rooted in a
personal-value paradigm, the judicial result may be the same: namely, that a
court impels a blood transfusion. The articulated justification may be the
same - the state's interest in preserving life and our human knowledge of
the force of our human instinct for survival. However, the personal-value
paradigm as the reasoning process supporting such a result is more respect-
ful of persons, more reflective of the personal fact situations, and more pro-
tective of legal rights and the community's expectation of the judicial
process.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
Few would argue that there is only one right answer to any judicial resolu-
tion of conflicting interests 97- especially when human beings must balance
their perceptions of the facts and their understanding of legal and communal
values. Few, if in a judge's position in these or similar cases, could arrive
easily at a conclusion which could result in death, however perfect the con-
95. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 73, at 92.
96. J. FOWLER, supra note 62, at 302.
97. L. CARTER, REASON IN LAW 239-41 (1979).
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stitutional analysis might be. For the community good and for the viability
of the law as a way to resolve conflict in a pluralistic society, what are
needed are fallible human judges who impose the human condition into judi-
cial reasoning. What is important to the community is the quality of legal
reasoning and its resonance with the facts and values of the community and
the credibility between results and justification for results. A community
needs to have confidence that its courts harmonize conflicting values fairly.98
Those holding minority positions need to believe that they will have a fair
hearing in court.
The constitutional analytical criticisms of the ex parte hearings, and the
analogizing of the Jehovah's Witness' refusal for a blood transfusion to an
attempted suicide or an abandonment of children are not intrinsically credi-
ble in view of the real facts of the parties' lives in Dorone. The characteriza-
tion of a twenty-two year old married Jehovah's Witness "as a neglected
minor" even when four hours before he lost consciousness he fully, compe-
tently and consciously refused a transfusion99 is an unnecessary stress on the
credibility of, and ultimately the durability of the judicial process. Results,
even good results, should not be too distanced from the reasoning advanced
for their justification. If this becomes the general practice, improper and
unjust results will require no better judicial justification.
It appears that an analysis based on a personal-value paradigm lessens the
credibility gap between the result and the reasoning in these cases. It seems
close to human experience to conclude that one must compel a blood trans-
fusion because we humans, however hard we tried, could not meet an evi-
dentiary burden of proof reasonably related to what has been learned about
our human experience of the developmental process of maturation in faith
than to say a believer is scrupulous, a neglected child, or even suicidal. If the
value is enough to force an individual to court, he has a fair chance to prove
his case. Though the burden of proof is difficult, the real opportunity exists
for it to be met. That we may not be able, however honest our judicial at-
tempt, to reach a level of judicial certitude is a result of the mystery of life
itself, not "arbitrariness" or "characteristic superficiality" or "state insensi-
tivity." Judicial analysis starting from a person's values, particularly his
value of faith, is the best effort that can be made to guarantee personal and
constitutional freedoms. After all, angels can do no more.
98. Id. at 239.
99. Holmes v. Silver Cross Hosp. of Joliet, Ill., 340 F. Supp. 125, 128 (N.D. III. 1972).
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